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Introductions to the mathematical notion of set standardly explicate that notion by distinguishing it from a vaguer, more ordinary notion of aggregation, collection, or combination.
Since Cantor and Frege, students have been warned that sets are not located in space-time and cannot be perceived or acted upon, and that a set of, say, fifty-two playing cards is not to be confused with the set of the four suits. The severity of this warning-and the usefulness and power of set theory-have led to the neglect of the ordinary notion of aggregation. The purpose of this paper is to refine that notion and give it a place in semantical and philosophical analysis.'
Refinement is worthwhile for two reasons. First, the notion is useful in giving semantically intelligible form to some of our descriptions involving plural constructions and mass terms. Second, the notion will serve to hone the distinction between concrete and abstract objects.
I
(1) The stars that presently make up the Pleaides galactic cluster occupy an area that measures 700 cubic light years.
The term 'occupy' in (1) seems intuitively to relate the stars to an area of space. But how are we to give formal representation to the subject term? We cannot reasonably utilize a quantified analysis to the effect that every star in the cluster occupies the area. 'Occupy' does not apply to the stars taken individually- NOUS 11 (1977) ? by Indiana University 97 but somehow collectively. We might change the logic underlying our semantical theory so as to admit plural subjects and multigrade relations. But although this alternative is doubtless worth exploring, it seems likely to breed undesirable complication. The most natural tack is to treat the subject term in (1) as a singular term and give the relational predicate the reading 'occupies'. We have precedent (for example, in our dealings with quantified sentences) for counting the difference between singular and plural forms of natural-language predicate expressions irrelevant as far as our formal representation of those expressions is concerned, and for locating the effect of the plural elsewhere in the sentence. Thus, the expression 'occupy'
in 'All men occupy space' is formally represented by the same predicate as is 'occupies' in 'Burge occupies space'. But if we are to treat the subject term in (1) as a singular term, what does it denote ?2 A first impulse is to invoke the set of the relevant stars.
But such an invocation fails to represent (1) under a plausibly intended interpretation. For sets never occupy space. There are several possible defenses against this objection, but none seems satisfactory. One defense denies that the view that (1) predicates 'occupies' of a set and an area commits one to saying that a set occupies the area. (Cf. Grandy [8] .) Another claims that any semantical account of (1) will have to introduce notions that are unfamiliar to many native speakers and that there is nothing wrong with introducing a set to interpret the subject term and a notion of set-occupation, which is easily explained, to interpret the predicate. The first defense is ad hoc and undermotivated. The second stands only if one cannot give an illuminating account of (1) which is more satisfying to the intuitions-and more adequate in representing the intentions-of natural-language users. Both defenses are made less persuasive by considering sentences like, 'The Pleiades galactic cluster occupies the area'. In such cases it is clear that the predicate which represents 'occupies' applies to a physical object (in this case, the cluster.)3 There is no intuitive basis for thinking that the stars occupy the area in a different sense ("set-occupies") from the sense in which the cluster occupies it. An alternative in representing (1) is to look to the calculus of individuals and appeal to a sum (cf. [10] and [5] , esp. pp. 51-2) of the relevant stars. This interpretation rejects the view that the subject term in (1) applies to an abstract object. But it would nevertheless misrepresent our method of individuating concrete pluralities. The relevant sum of stars would be individuated in terms of all objects having common (say, spatio-temporal) parts with the stars. Such parts-and hence ultimately the sum-would be "constructed from" and individuated by reference to objects (such as occupied space-time points) that have no other objects as parts. It is, I think, uncontroversial that in using ordinary discourse we do not take predicates true of partless objects as the primitive basis for any such construction or individuation. It is equally clear that we do not individuate objects denoted by plural descriptions like 'the stars in the cluster' by reference to all objects that share some spatio-temporal region with any of the stars. We count pluralities of stars the same just in case they involve the same stars.
The question of what method we employ to individuate concrete pluralities should be distinguished from the question of whether the two methods we have mentioned always pick out the same objects. The first question bears on the formal representation of natural and scientific discourse and is the only one at issue here. I shall remark on the second in Section IV.
Problems similar to those developed with reference to (1) also arise in interpreting sentences like:
(2) Stone Mountain is constituted of a meteor, which is in turn constituted of its atoms. Of course, some of these sentences may be roughly "paraphrased" in such a way as to avoid reference to an aggregate-like entity. But such "paraphrases" are sufficiently complicated to be disqualified as candidates for representing the logical form of the original sentences. Moreover, there does not seem to be any uniform way of coming up with such paraphrases. Our notion of aggregate is meant to aid in interpreting plausible, formal representations of pluralized descriptions in sentences like (1)-(5)-
II
From a purely formal point of view, the principles of aggregation that I shall employ are familiar. They may be obtained by two steps: first, limit set theory to first-order sets (sets with only individuals as members), where there is no null set and where each singleton set is identified with its member; second, replace the primitive 'is a member of' by 'is a member-component of' (abbreviated 'a'). We then define 'x is an aggregate', 'A (x)', as follows:
A(x) < >df (3z) (3y) (zax & yax & z~y).
Before further articulating the principles of aggregation, we must say a word about the underlying logic. I shall be assuming a logic with definite descriptions and a restriction on instantiation:
where 'A' ranges over well-formed formulae, 't' over singular terms, and 'A(x/t)' is read, 'the result of substituting t for all occurrences of the variable x, rewriting bound variables where necessary'. The chief principle for descriptions is (7) (x) (x = (7y)A + (y) (A ++ y = x)), where variable x $ variable y, and x is not free in A. The effect of failure of reference on truth-value is summarized in the principle (8) At -(3y) (y = t), where A is any atomic predicate, including identity, t is any argument expression of A, and y is not free in t. Thus (roughly), if a singular term in an atomic sentence does not denote, the containing sentence is untrue. The semantics supplies no denotation for intuitively non-denoting singular terms. Aside from (6)-(8) our underlying logic contains no surprises. (For details, see [2] .)
We now turn to axioms for aggregation. To simplify formulation, I introduce the following definition schema for an analog to set-abstraction:
The definiendum literally reads, 'the totality of objects that are member-components of some q'. Analogous to comprehension 
The antecedent is motivated by the regional character of our theory. Since we are not assuming that all objects are aggregates, the antecedent is necessary to avoid collapsing distinctions among non-aggregates. On our view, only individuals are member-components of aggregates:
(A4) xay -I(x).
It will be convenient to take individuals as their own unique member-components:
The analogy to Quine's treatment of individuals will be evident.
(Cf. [14] .)
Our axioms yield existence assertions about aggregates only if they are supplemented with existence assertions about individuals. Supplementation must come from the rest of our empirical theory. For example, we need to know that there are tigers (and that tigers are individuals) before we can derive that The formal analogies between aggregates and first-order sets should not obscure the differences. Aggregates, like their member-components and unlike sets, are physical objects having spatio-temporal location and the capability of exerting forces and undergoing changes. Like their member-components, aggregates come into and pass out of existence. Membercomponents of aggregates are spatio-temporal parts of the aggregate, although not all parts of an aggregate are membercomponents of it. For example, each tiger in the aggregate of all tigers is part of that aggregate; but whereas proper parts of tigers (tiger hearts) are parts of that aggregate, they are not member-components of it.
One might grant the usefulness of aggregates in interpreting sentences of science and ordinary discourse, yet still wonder whether aggregates are eliminable in favor of other kinds of entities. Since my interest here is interpretative, I need not argue the issue of reduction. But a few remarks are in order.
The two most obvious reductions would be to individuals and to sets. Quite apart from general questions about the ontological relevance of reductions of this sort, neither seems immediately compelling as an argument for elimination. Take the reduction to individuals. It would require eliminating occurrences of predicates like 'is scattered', 'is in equilibrium', and so on, in favor of complex descriptions of relations between individuals. The complexity of carrying out the task for all aggregates under all circumstances becomes discouraging when one considers the complexity of micro-macro explanations (reductions?) in statistical mechanics, where certain simple aggregates are considered only under the most idealized conditions. Moreover, reductions of aggregates to individuals would have to be argued for one by one, since there seems to be no general method of carrying them out.
The reduction of aggregates to sets would be simpler from a purely formal point of view. In addition to the easy mapping between such aggregates and first-order sets, we would also need to introduce new predicates ("set-scattered") to replace predicates peculiarly applicable to aggregates; and we would require a cumbersome duplication of predicates (adding "set-visible" and "set-occupies space" to go along with 'visible' and 'occupies space') in cases where we apply a predicate both to aggregates and to individuals. The details would be tedious, but perhaps not theoretically difficult. What is questionable is whether the procedure explains anything. It promises the same explanatory vacuity and intuitive implausibility that "eliminating" physicalobject individuals by identifying them with their singleton sets would yield. Our feeling is that certain physical-object individuals play an epistemological role in our theorizing that would be distorted or obscured if they were eliminated in favor of sets. In Section III, I shall argue that certain aggregates play a similar role.
Our motivation for restricting principles for aggregates to those analogous to principles for first-order sets is what we want a system that is plausibly nominalistic: whatever else besides physical objects there may be, aggregates themselves are taken to be physical. Our "first-order" principles will not allow us to distinguish aggregates except by reference to physical-object individuals. In particular, for n individuals, there will be (2n -(n + 1)) aggregates. Suppose that we were to allow The notion of aggregate, like that of first-order set, presupposes a notion of individual. Given our interpretative purpose, we shall expect the individuals of the theory to be provided by our antecedently-developed empirical discourse. More specifically, we assume a finite list of syntactically simple, one-place predicates which apply to physical things (see n. 3) and which are derived from count-nouns. For purposes of interpreting our ordinary discourse, these will be roughly the primitive, sortal thing predicates of English. The list is understood to exclude count-noun predicates, such as 'is an aggregate', which are true of aggregates or which obey the principles of inclusive reference or cumulative reference to be stated in Section III. Intuitively, the relevant predicates will apply to objects individuated at least partly by reference to their structure or function, rather than merely to their composition.
Initially, we define 'x is an individual', abbreviated 'I(x)', in terms of a disjunction of all the predicates on the list. As a rough illustration:
The specificity of a definition like (Il) renders the notion of individual extremely sensitive to changes in language or theory. Our focus in (Ii) on physical things was guided by a desire to simplify exposition. We could have allowed physical events as individuals without extensive changes in viewpoint. Indeed, doing so may help in understanding certain natural phenomena, such as light and electricity.
The premium placed on primitive one-place predicates in (Ii) is important. Since we are not admitting non-extensional temporal operators iAto our logic, objects satisfying such predicates will not at any time fail to satisfy them. Thus, if 'atom' is placed on the list, it will not be understood as satisfied by an aggregate of elementary particles when and only when those particles are configurated in an atomic structure. On such an understanding, what was (not simply "made up ") an atom would cease to be one if the atomic structure were broken by the dispersal of particles. Such a construal would take atomic structure as a temporally relative property of the aggregate, rather than as constitutive of an individual. And 'atom' would be a two-place phaseal predicate like 'banker' or 'sapling'. (What once was a sapling might cease to be one without ceasing to exist. Cf. [3] .) To treat 'atom' as primitively one-place, on the other hand, is to view an atom as an entity numerically distinct from the aggregate of particles that constitute it. (A reason to view atoms in this way is that we often speak of them as continuing to exist, undispersed, even though they exchange some of their constituent particles.) Of course, the theory of aggregates is neutral as to what predicates are used to determine the individuals. But I shall be making the natural assumption that numerous structurally complex physical objects are individuals.
Ill
The use of our theory in representing sentences (1)- (5) is straightforward. For example, we can read (1) as 'The aggregate of stars that presently makes up the Pleiades galactic cluster occupies an area that measures 700 cubic light years'. The aggregation operator defined in Section II can be invoked in all these cases.
Moreover, we can also handle sentences like (9) The aggregates of stars presently in the Pleiades occupy an area that measures 700 cubic light years.
Sentences like (9) should probably be regarded as true. Each of the 2n -(n + 1) aggregates (for n stars in the cluster) occupies space. Collectively, the aggregates of stars should occupy the same space that the stars collectively occupy. Indeed, the aggregates of stars "taken collectively" are just the individuals in them "taken collectively". This can be seen by substituting 'aggregate of stars in the Pleiades' for 'q' in the aggregation description.' Grammatical parallels between mass terms and the plural forms of common nouns have often been noted. Semantical analogies also obtain. The principles of "taking objects collectively" that we have discussed in relation to concrete pluralities carry over to at least some stuffs. Analogs to sentences (1)- (5) are easily constructed. For example, to (3) and (4): (10) Water is widespread. (11) The hydrogen in the flask is in equilibrium.
Some of these analogs (e.g., (11) ) have readings that may be represented with demonstrative-governed definite descriptions. But (11), like (10), may be taken as specifying a totality and thus is served by the aggregation operator. 8 If a mass term is true of aggregates at all, it is ordinarily true of aggregates composed of other aggregates that also satisfy the predicate. To sharpen this point, we define a predicate for aggregate-inclusion:
Y x x df (3w) (way) &(z)(zay-*zax).
One-place physical-object sortals are true of individuals but not ordinarily of aggregates of those individuals. A one-place mass-term predicate, on the other hand, is true of every aggregate included in the aggregate of all individuals which it is true of. For example, 'is some water' is true not only of the totality of water, but of all smaller quantities of water down to the molecules. Formally, one-place mass-term predicates that apply to aggregates will substitute for '%o' in the schema (IR) Y C [x: f~x)] ++ OMWe shall call (IR) the principle of inclusive reference.
We must now ask how to define 'individual' in our extended theory. One might be inclined to do so by simply adding mass-term predicates to the disjunction in (Il), thereby including among the individuals quantities of stuff of any size. There are, however, two strong objections to defining individuals of stuff aggregates in this way. One is that doing so would prevent us from ever identifying aggregates determined by mass terms with aggregates determined by sortals. For example, a given quantity of water could not be identified with the aggregate of its constituent water molecules because the former would have member-components (non-minimal quantities of water) which the latter would not have.
A deeper objection is that such a definition forces a choice between giving up the theory's nominalism and altering its most central and natural principles. For by the definition, the we take the aggregate-union (cf. (U)) of these "individuals", thereby giving us the aggregate with these two pairs as its member-components. To preserve extensionality (A 3), this aggregate must be distinguished from the previous four. The procedure could continue indefinitely to evolve from three water molecules a veritable overflow of unnaturally selected entities. Any alteration of (IR), (Al), or (A 3) radical enough to block the argument would either deprive our theory of explanatory interest or change it into a theory (more like the calculus of individuals) where concrete totalities are not individuated by reference to member-components.
Given these alternatives, we should forego the proffered disjunctive definition of 'individual' and hold that not everything that satisfies a mass-term predicate is an individual of the theory. Whereas there is an aggregate of all minimal water units, there is no aggregate of all quantities of water (cf. (A4)).
As long as we focused on sortal predicates, (II) and (I2) were equally acceptable definitions of 'individual'. This is because (IR) does not apply for sortals. Extending (II) to include mass terms led to difficulties, so we take (I2) as the theory's definition of 'individual'. But we should not stop here. (Il) connected aggregate theory to the rest of our empirical discourse. Having dropped that definition in favor of a less informative one, we are left with the need to re-establish a connection. The gap can be spanned by adding postulates. We add one to the (metalinguistic) effect that if anything satisfies one of the sortal predicates in (Il), then it is an individual. More Ordinary reference to member-components of stuffaggregates is infrequent because such components are often not easily distinguishable. Sometimes this is merely a practical difficulty, and sometimes, as was once the case with water, the criterion is a matter for future discovery. But sometimes, as in the case of mixtures, the criterion may seem unobvious, even given the relevant scientific information. Some will take these cases as indicating that stuffs other than the pure substances (substances like water, gold) are not aggregates. But I think that the theory can be extended.
Let There remains, however, a serious difficulty not met by this suggestion. Suppose we proclaim that a minimal lemonade unit in a particular quantity of lemonade consists of 350 water molecules, one sugar molecule, and one citric-acid molecule.
(To simplify matters, we assume that lemon juice is citric acid.) We could make analogous decisions about how to apportion additions to the mixture and how to partition arbitrary mixtures of lemonade. Still, we have the problem of saying which H2 0 molecules in the solution go with which sugar crystals and which citric acid molecules to make up the "lemonade individuals". And surely there is no non-arbitrary principle of segregation. with water to a point where the result is no longer lemonade, then ordinarily there will be no lemonade in the container. In such a case, the original lemonade may in principle be recovered by recovering the original components and mixing them appropriately. If one removes some water (strictly speaking, I think, even one molecule) from a container of lemonade, without disturbing the sugar and citric acid, there is less (though stronger) lemonade in the container; and we would not say that the original lemonade is scattered-partly in the container, partly elsewhere. Instead, there is less lemonade in the world.
These points may be generalized.
How, then, are we to apply aggregate theory to mixtures?
We can explicate these points by denying that a quantity of lemonade is an aggregate of individuals that are themselves lemonade. The relevant individuals are the water molecules, sugar molecules, and citric-acid molecules. Of course, any aggregate of such molecules will pre-exist the mixing that made them into lemonade. So if some lemonade is taken to "be" an aggregate of the relevant individuals, it must be such an aggregate in roughly the same sense in which some ice is some water (H20). The point is that the lemonade mixture is a temporal phase of the aggregate: a phase during which the relevant molecules are integrated within certain proportions.
One is dealing with the same lemonade as long as one is dealing with the same aggregate and that aggregate and its components do not violate the appropriate mixture conditions. We have inclined toward treating mixtures as phases of aggregates of individuals, while we have leaned toward taking atoms, molecules, mountains, stars, tigers, and marbles as individuals (rather than as phases of the aggregates of some of their constituents). What considerations underlie these inclinations? Some individuals can lose or exchange their immediate constituents yet remain the same object. This may be true of certain molecules; it is certainly true of atoms, mountains, stars, tigers, and marbles. On the other hand, a necessary condition for sameness of aggregate-phase is identity of membercomponents. Thus, although our lemonade could give or take an electron, it is individuated partly by reference to identity of its component molecules. This point suggests, I think, a more fundamental one. By and large, we incline more to treat a physical object (other than an elementary particle) as an individual the more its individuation is dependent on reference to a constant, "interesting" physical structure among its constituents (even if the constituents change) or to a constant function of the whole. Quantities of substances (like water) and The argument as stated rests on a thought experiment that is wildly implausible from a physical point of view. Hydrogen and oxygen atoms do not come into existence the moment they form a water molecule, nor do they often pass out of existence when the molecule decomposes. But there are -rare cases in nature that satisfy our argument. When gamma rays in an electric field pass through certain nuclei, there is a significant probability in low-energy systems that an electron and a positron will be formed in the bonded state as positronium.
Since positronium is unstable, the probability is high that its constituents will in a (very) short time collide and annihilate to produce two gamma rays (or sometimes just one). Thus, as far as physical theory can determine, many positronium atoms occupy the same space-time that the respective aggregates of their constituents do.' 1 On fairly natural assumptions about what count as individuals (atoms as well as elementary particles), aggregate theory distinguishes these positronium atoms from the aggregates of their constituents. On these assumptions, (P) is not only not necessary; it is false.
Clearly, this argument against (P) depends on the view that non-minimally-sized constituents of the universe are individuals and on axioms (A1) and (A 3). I assume that natural language and scientific theory commonly accept complex entities as individuals. If aggregate theory is a reasonable tool in explicating some natural and scientific discourse, then the view of physical objects presupposed in such discourse does not include (P). What might this view be?
In Sections II and III, I argued that allowing plurality aggregates as member-components would controvert nominalist intuitions because we would thereby be able to distinguish objects that could not possibly or conceivably differ in their spatio-temporal location or in the forces they exert or undergo.
I have just argued that given natural assumptions about individuals, aggregate theory, though nominalistic, distinguishes objects which do not differ in spatio-temporal location. The key reconciling the arguments lies in the modal adverbs. Any positron-electron aggregate that coincides spatio-temporally with a positronium atom could conceivably or possibly have failed to constitute it. The positron and electron might never have been bonded (in which case the aggregate would have existed, but the atom would not have). Or the aggregate could have predated the formation of the atom or postdated its demise. There are also dispositional differences. For example, the aggregate is scatterable, whereas the atom is not.
It would be a mistake, of course, to think that the only differences between the individual and the coincident aggregate are modal. The two objects differ in kind, one being a positronium atom, the other, an aggregate. It is plausible to view the modal differences as inductively projected from categorical, non-modal, differences between other members of the respective kinds. (For the classical development of this theme, see Goodman [7] .) For example, we project from the fact that most positron-electron pair aggregates have scattered, unbonded member-components. Positronium atoms, on the other hand, are identified by reference to the positron-electron bond.
Kind predicates themselves depend for their application at least partly on our inductions from, or reactions to, other categorical differences among objects. On the view of physical objects we have been elaborating, particular physical objects may on occasion satisfy different modal and kind predicates without differing in their spatio-temporal histories. The applica-tions of kind predicates and modal predicates that we have developed by inductive projection from other cases commit us on these occasions to distinguishing coincidentally coincident objects. Thus, on the present view, individuation depends essentially on inductive (or reactional) projection. For proponents of (P), spatio-temporal location is ultimately all that counts.
On a natural selection of individuals, occasions in which different objects spatio-temporally coincide are relatively rare in nature-and perhaps for good reason. If modal predicates are applied on the basis of projections from statements using kind predicates and historical predicates, then two objects that satisfy the same historical predicates but different modal predicates will belong to different kinds most of whose respective members differ from one another historically. The assumption is that we usefully (and truly) distinguish historical- Another possible restriction on counterexamples to (P) should be mentioned. Of the two spatio-temporally coincident objects in our example, only one is a physicaindividual. Perhaps we never distinguish spatio-temporally coincident individuals. (Indeed, some philosophers would intend (P) only in this sense; cf. n. 3.) Of course, exploring this conjecture would necessitate further specification of the notion of individual. I have suggested that the individuals of a natural language or scientific theory are informatively identified by reference to its primitive, one-place physical-object, sortal predicates." 2 We acquire such predicates to facilitate induction and simplify empirical descriptions and generalizations. Thus, our notion of physical object beds down with our methods of induction and our intuitions about simplicity. Unfortunately, in philosophy, to uncover the bedfellows is not to reveal the form of their relationship.
